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Brendan DasseytranscripttranscriptRenewed Gordon-Exclusion Motion, Ruling, and Proposed State Rebuttal Witnesses - Day 7 - Brendan DasseyThe court denied the State's renewed motion to exclude Dr. Gordon, limiting his testimony to Dassey's vulnerability to suggestibility. It deferred a decision on the scope of proposed rebuttal testimony from Mr. Buckley.
Kenneth R. KratzMark R. FremgenJerome L. FoxTHE COURTMR. KRATZMR. FREMGENprocedural
Brendan Dassey/Day 7/April 23, 2007
5 pages·2 witnesses·1,599 lines
Brendan Dassey testified about the bonfire, garage cleanup and accounts he said he had made up. A fingerprint examiner discussed prints from the RAV4, and the court set limits on Dr. Gordon’s suggestibility testimony.
Renewed motion to exclude Dr. Gordon, ruling, and separate proposed State rebuttal witnesses
ProceduralProc.Renewed motion to exclude Dr. Gordon, ruling, and separate proposed State rebuttal witnesses

(Jury out at 2:14 p.m.)

THE COURT: Counsel, before coming out here on the record, we have a brief -- we had a brief discussion in chambers. It's my understanding, uh, there's some matters we should make of record this afternoon. Mr. Kratz, I'm going to turn to you first. You may or may not have a motion or an argument?

MR. KRATZ: I do, Judge. If I could have just a moment to grab my materials. Thank you, Judge. As this Court recalls, a motion was argued in a pretrial manner regarding the admissibility of testimony of a Dr. Robert Gordon. Dr. Gordon provided this Court through, um, videotape testimony, uh, with something called an offer of proof, which is expected trial testimony, and based an opinion on what Dr. Gordon believed evidence at this trial was going to establish.

Dr. Gordon, as this Court knows, uh, has, uh, opined in a, uh, written report, and in his offer of proof, that, uh, Brendan Dassey, uh, was, in fact, an individual who was, uh, using his term now, "vulnerable to suggestibility".

The State had objected in a, uh, oral argument, as well as a, uh, written provisions to the Court, to Dr. Gordon's testimony, noting that this kind of evidence has not been, uh, admitted in the state of Wisconsin, at least to this point. And whatever, uh, marginal relevance there may be, uh, is certainly outweighed by the danger of confusion, uh, of the jury, or unfair prejudice.

Um, nonetheless, uh, the Court, uh, reasoned, in a pretrial decision, that Dr. Gordon would be allowed to testify, uh, as to the area of suggestibility, again, based upon, uh, an offer of proof.

Uh, I recall, and I'm sure, um, the Court, uh, has a recollection as to, um, my argument, both oral and written, uh, cautioning, uh, this Court as to its pretrial ruling prior to even knowing what the trial testimony was going to be, especially as it relates to foundation or to relevance. And what I argued, Judge, was that it's going to depend on who is going to testify in this trial that Brendan Dassey's statements were the product of suggestibility.

In other words, that somebody had to come before this Court and claim that Brendan Dassey's statements to law enforcement officials, uh, were, in fact, the product of law enforcement behavior, law enforcement, uh, suggestibility, or, at the very least, some coercive practices by law enforcement, for Dr. Gordon's testimony to ever be relevant.

Uh, relevance, uh, of course, is, uh -- is well-defined, and this Court included, uh, that in its, uh, pretrial ruling. And I'm not going to, uh, reargue or belabor that. I agree with the Court's, uh, definition and explanation as to relevance.

Uh, now, however, we're at the point in the trial where we don't have to guess as to what the trial testimony is going to be. We don't have to call it an offer of proof anymore, or, uh, expect or, um, uh, presuppose what some trial testimony may be. We've now heard what the defense theory of the case is, what the defense version is, and as, uh, announced by this Court, and as predicted by the State in my written brief, Brendan Dassey, himself, has testified and has provided to the Court, uh, with a version of events or an explanation as to, uh, the admissions, or what we've referred to as the confession, given, uh, in this case.

Uh, importantly, Judge, uh, Mr. Dassey today, uh, when testifying in this trial, said nothing of suggestibility despite Mr. Fremgen's best efforts, uh, in continuing to ask Mr. Dassey about, uh, things like suggestibility. Mr. Dassey's responses, when he didn't say, "I don't know", um, Mr. Dassey's, uh, response was something called confabulation. That is, that he made it up. That he made up the, uh, version of events that he told law enforcement officials.

Confabulation is, of course, um, absolutely a separate, uh, concept than suggestibility. Uh, and when Mr. Dassey and the defense, through Mr. Fremgen and, uh, Mr. Edelstein, who, I assume, knew what Mr. Dassey was going to testify about today, present that theory of defense, and that theory is, uh, devoid of any mention of suggestibility, well, then, Dr. Gordon's testimony just simply no longer becomes relevant.

Uh, this Court's pretrial, uh, uh, order and ruling, which, uh, the State respects, uh, very much, must simply -- uh, is no longer based upon, uh, what the trial evidence is in this case.

When Mr. Dassey explains, uh, that, uh, the version of events given to law enforcement is, uh, the product of -- of fabrication, or even if, uh -- if we believe that it's the product of, uh, some memory several years ago of some book that he may or may not, uh, have read, uh, it is just not suggestibility. Uh, I then, uh, and at this time, renew my motion, ask the Court to reconsider its finding as to Dr. Gordon's testimony. We're asking that Dr. Gordon's testimony be excluded. We don't believe there is any foundation in this record, uh, nor is there any relevance, uh, to, uh, Dr. Gordon's ultimate opinion that, uh, Mr. Dassey is vulnerable to suggestibility.

Now, we understand that this Court has already limited Dr. Gordon's testimony. This Court's already previously indicated that Dr. Gordon can't talk about whether the confession was true or false. That is, uh, whether it was a false confession. Can't talk about a coercion or the circumstances surrounding, uh, the, uh, interrogation. And although there are experts that can talk about that, Dr. Gordon admits that he's not one of those kind of, uh, individuals. But his testing and his opinion, uh, as limited to suggestibility, uh, simply, uh, is not, uh, relevant. Would ask the Court revisit and exclude the testimony.

Alternatively, Judge, uh, we are asking, if the Court continues to allow Dr. Gordon's, uh, testimony, uh, in this case, despite, uh, the lack of foundation for his testimony, uh, we would ask the Court, uh, reassert or restate, uh, just what it is that Dr. Gordon can testify about. Just what is relevant about Dr. Gordon's testimony based upon the record currently, uh, before this Court.

We certainly don't want to be ina position where we're needlessly objecting during, um, uh, direct examination, uh, or that the, uh, State, unnecessarily, uh, has to cross-examining -- cross-examine, uh, Dr. Gordon, uh, on issues that, uh, may, in fact, not be allowed through this Court's, um -- this Court's orders.

Lastly, Judge, at the conclusion of this motion, that is, at the conclusion of my motion to exclude, or the renewal of my motion to exclude, uh, I would ask, also, to place on the record the, uh, State's request to call, if necessary, rebuttal witnesses.

But I have, uh, unfortunately, gotten ahead of myself, and I'm just alerting the Court that we do have that issue to discuss as well. That's all the, uh, comments I have regarding Dr. Gordon's issue. Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Response?

MR. FREMGEN: Uh, just a little -- a brief one. Well, I'll try to be brief. The State, uh, began its, uh, argument by indicating that, uh, um, they expected Dr. Gordon to testify as to what evidence would indicate in this trial. Well, I don't think that's ever been what we've offered to this Court. And I'm certain that's not what the order of this Court is.

What we've offered, previously, is that the doctor would testify as to his conclusions based upon his evaluation of Brendan, his review of the collateral information, which included, uh, the videotape statement that was shown in this court, as well as other statements that had not been provided to the jury, and he would also, uh, testify as to the different tools of evaluation, the different, um, um, tests that he actually conducted, and -- and the purpose for those tests, including the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Test.

We intend to offer the same testimony with the same limitations that the Court imposed on his testimony per the order of April 5. The State's argument today is that there needs to be additional foundation, essentially, or that there hasn't been a sufficient foundation placed on the record for the doctor's testimony.

Part of what the State argues is -- well, I -- I think maybe he misspoke, but Mr. Kratz said foundation as to suggestion or coercion. We've never once indicated that Dr. Gordon would ever testify as to any coercion. In fact, he even, in the offer of proof, said I don't have the ability to do that and would not offer his, uh, uh, opinion as to the officer's, uh, techniques in regards to coercion.

So that was never an option. It was never going to be something offered to the Court. The indication that we provided to the Court, with the limitations in the order, simply that he would be testifying about the issue of suggestibility, or vulnerable to suggestion, as I think he referenced in his report.

So far, the testimony on direct and on cross of the defendant was that, as to many questions, he answered, I don't know why. When asked why he would admit to a serious offense, such as sexual assault, or first degree intentional homicide, his answer is, I don't know why.

At -- I probably could count up, on the transcript, and come up with at least 20 or 25 times that that came out. There were times in final cross by Mr. Fallon that -- that this idea of confabulation came up, but there's equal or more, um, testimony in regards to why he did what he did, and his answers were, I don't know why.

Our intention is to wrap up what we've started with all the witnesses, with the -- Officer Wiegert and with Detective O'Neill, for that matter. Attorney Edelstein's questioning of the -- at least with Detective Wiegert was, essentially, 90 percent suggestibility issues. Promises, lies, suggestion, um, and leading.

With Dr. -- with Detective O'Neill, there was a number of questions about suggestion, leading, promises. In fact, the State brought up the subject when the State says there's devoid of anything in the record about suggestibility. The State, on cross of the school counselor, asked her about suggestibility. So the issue has been raised by the State as well. We would certainly object to the ruling changing the original ruling.

And as far as offering to the State some sort of a, um -- a road map of where I intend to go, or some, uh, formalized transcript of the question and answers that I intend to -- to elicit from the -- the doctor, I guess I would offer, again, we will follow what the Court ordered, the offer of proof with the limitations that this Court has set upon the testimony, and as to providing to the State some sort of heads up as -- so to speak, I guess I would just mimmick what the State has told me throughout this trial, I'll question my witnesses how I want, without having to answer to the State.

And, so, I -- I would follow the order that the Court placed on us, and I don't believe that there has been, uh, this lack of foundation that the State is suggesting with the -- the Court, now, to change the ruling before in regards to Dr. Gordon.

THE COURT: Mr. Kratz, any response?

MR. KRATZ: I don't have any. Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Uh, is -- both parties have noted the Court has had an opportunity, prior to this day, to take up the issue of Dr. Gordon and any testimony that he might have to offer. The Court ruled that Dr. Gordon's testimony -- and -- and I did this based on a couple of things, or based on, uh, the instance of seeing a proposed offer of proof from the defense by way of DVD and, as well, uh, the testimony educed by Mr. Kratz at a cross-examination of Dr. Gordon.

Uh, under Section 9-0-7-0-2 of the Wisconsin Statutes, uh, expert witness testimony is permitted if the proffered testimony is relevant, if it will assist the trier of fact in some way, shape or form, if the expert is qualified, and if the testimony that's going to be offered is not supler -- superfluous or a waste of time. This all stems from a case called State vs., uh, Walstad at 119 Wis. 2d 483.

I found, uh, initially, that all of these qualifications were met. Uh, there also is a secondary line of reasoning that can occasionally be employed. Namely, that, by virtue of the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1 Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, a defendant should have the right to present a defense. And while I didn't make a finding, directly, on that point, I think I alluded to it, at least collaterally, in arriving at the ruling.

Mr. Kratz says, uh, in effect, that, based on the testimony offered by this defendant in person today, that the foundation for any kind of testimony from Dr. Gordon with respect to suggestibility is, in effect, vitiated. That is to say, taken away.

Uh, that his testimony -- uh, Dr. Gordon's testimony no longer becomes relevant and, thus, it misses on the first, uh, uh, step, the first prong, of the test of whether or not it -- it should be used in this case.

Uh, I'm not going to recede from the ruling that I -- I handed down before. I think what we, uh, have, at best today, is testimony that doesn't go to the admissibility of anything Dr. Gordon has to say.

And, again, what Dr. Gordon is -- as I understand it -- going to testify to, that based on a number of tests that he administered this defendant, based on the age of the defendant, based on the defendant's, uh, limited, uh, cognitive abilities, that this defendant falls in the category that, scientifically, has been adjudged as being a category of persons being more suggestible or vulnerable to, uh, same things that aren't necessarily true.

I think that Dr. Gordon's testimony is sill relevant. I think that he is a qualified expert. I think that his familiarity with the, uh, Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale, and the other tests that were given to, uh, support whatever opinions he's going to give, uh, are all as good today as they were before.

Now, with that said, it may be, again, that while his testimony is cer -- I believe admissible, uh, it is up to the jury as to what weight that testimony should -- should give. They are the -- they are the persons that determine the weight.

I also find that I -- I do not believe, based on anything I've heard today or during the course of the trial, that his -- his testimony would be, uh, superfluous.

Accordingly, I'm going to deny, uh, the State's motion to exclude his testimony.

MR. KRATZ: Judge, I -- and -- and I -- and I don't mean to, uh -- to take issue with the Court, you mentioned that the doctor would testify to being vulnerable to saying things that weren't necessarily true. I think that's exactly what the Court said he could not testify about. He's vulnerable to suggestibility, but whether it's true --

MR. KRATZ: -- or not true is something this doctor cannot testify.

THE COURT: Right. And -- and I did say that, and, uh, thank you. I'll -- I'll sharpen that up. He -- he can't testify as to what this defendant said as to whether it was true or false. He can testify as to the suggestibility, the vulnerability, based on the factors, but he cannot -- he cannot utter an opinion as to the -- the, uh, truthfulness or falsity of anything this defendant said.

MR. KRATZ: Thank you, Judge. As to my, uh, second, uh, purpose for, um, alerting the Court as to, uh, the State's, uh, intent, uh, with, uh, this Court, uh, reaffirming its ruling, the State does intend to, uh, and does offer at this time, two, uh, rebuttal, uh, witnesses.

Uh, one is a, um, clinical psychologist, who will directly, uh, rebut Dr. Gordon's testimony as to the testing, IQ, and what, uh, uh, opinions, uh, may be drawn, uh, therefrom. His name is Dr. James Armentrout. Uh, we, previously -- uh, previously, meaning earlier today. I don't mean to indicate, because of the rebuttal nature, that it was, uh, other than today, but, uh, informed defense counsel of our intent to, uh, call Dr. Armentrout as a rebuttal witness.

But, secondly, Judge, and something that we have alerted the Court and, uh, counsel to, uh, earlier, uh, was our intent to call an expert, uh, in the, um, areas as to the interrogative process. This Court may recall, as part of Dr. Gordon's, uh, offer of proof, Dr. Gordon indicated that he was not an expert on issues of interrogation strategy or circumstance, but that such experts do exist. Dr. Gordon, uh, conceded that fact to both -- uh, in court and on his, uh, DVDs.

The, uh, suggestion, and the effect of the matter is, then, uh, as to the area of suggestibility, uh, there is a -- a prong, if you will, as to the testing, and -- and the, uh, um, IQ, and the age, and the, uh, vulnerability to suggestibility that psychologists talk about, but the other part of that that Dr. Gordon talked about was the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, the strategies, and, uh -- and the like, that, uh -- that were employed, and what, um, after reviewing a specific, um, interrogation, uh, what opinions can be drawn therefrom.

State intends, as the defense and the Court knows, uh, to call a, uh, Mr. Joseph Buckley, uh, the president, as I believe, of, uh, Reid and Associates, uh, author, uh, and expert, uh, on issues of the interrogative process.

Uh, with the Court, uh, having, uh, reaffirmed this ruling, uh, we simply offer that. If the Court, uh, needs, uh, or the Court wishes some further, uh, offer of proof or sharpening of, uh, that partic -- uh, uh, Mr. Buckley's, uh, relevance, or his intended testimony, we can certainly do that. A report has been tendered to the Court and to, uh, the defense as to, uh, Mr. Buckley's, uh, intended testimony. If I could have just a moment here, Judge.

And, Judge, uh, you may want to just take judicial notice of the report of Mr. Buckley that has, uh, been provided to the Court, should Mr. Buckley's testimony be allowed. We'll certainly have that marked as a trial exhibit and will be officially offered at that time.

That's all I have as to, uh, again, just by way of, uh, alerting the Court and Counsel, uh, as to the State's intended rebuttal case. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Uh, does the defense wish to be heard on this, now? Rebuttal, of course, is at the discretion of the Court, and it -- it may be you want to wait until you hear what Dr. Gordon has to say. Although, I suspect, Mr. Buckley's rebuttal may have as much to do with the cross-examination of Investigator Wiegert as it does with anything that, uh -- that Dr. Gordon may say.

MR. FREMGEN: Up to the Court. I -- I don't think that Dr. Gordon's testimony, necessarily, is going to be indicative of what our position is with, uh, uh, Mr. Mead (phonetic). Um -- Or, Buckley? I'm sorry. Mr. Buckley.

MR. FREMGEN: Uh, our -- essentially, and let me first answer the first comment about, uh, Dr. Armentrout. Um, the only thing I would ask from the State, if, at the time he testifies, if there is any sort of summary of his, uh, impressions laid to some written form, that we be provided a copy prior to his testimony. Whether that be the second he sits down, however the State wishes to provide it, would be great. Also a CV. I mean, we provided our curriculum vitae of our doctor. If we could have Dr. Armentrout's sometime before he testifies, we would appreciate that as well.

However, as to, um, uh, Mr. Buckley, we have three essential positions as to why we don't think it's relevant. Number one, it's not a unique subject that this trier of fact, the jury, needs assistance to understand.

Um, in fact, they've had two witnesses, already, talk about it. Both detectives. Detective O'Neill and -- and, uh, Investigator Wiegert have testified that they are trained in deceptive practices, um, superior knowledge, whatever language is used to explain why they lied, promised, lead, or suggest to a -- a -- a interviewee in order to get information or extract information they want.

So, it's already -- it's a point, I won't say, necessarily, cumulative, but it certainly has been, um, uh, developed and addressed by the State.

It also seems to be somewhat of a vouching of the State's witness. Officer -- uh, Mr. Buckley would be testifying, essentially, that the officer's testimony that this is how we're trained and this is just simply, uh, uh, an interview technique would be a -- be an offer to sim -- simply, um, vouch for the voracity of the officer's testimony in that regard.

And we also believe that, uh, there are some comments in the report about what is corroborated and what is not that impedes and infringes upon what this jury's role is. And -- and the attorneys can certainly suggest to the jury, this is corroborated and this is uncorroborated. And that's fine. But I think it's different having a witness get up there and say, I've reviewed what the police officers did in this case, and let me tell you, jury, this is what they did right, and this is what they found, and this is why you can find this person guilty. I don't think that is the role of a expert.

Experts should be offering some sort of testimony that, number one, has to be relevant to some sort of material issue, which we don't think, necessarily, is -- that there is enough, uh, with this offer as of yet, and, number, two, we certainly have to say there is nothing that indicates that this trier of fact needs assistance to understand that.

In fact, I believe, in opening, Mr. Kratz mentioned to the jury, comments about officers', uh, questioning and why people don't admit to things that they didn't do, especially as serious as a homicide, because it's just human nature. You all understand that. Quote, unquote. That was what Mr. Kratz said to the jury.

Well, if they understand it, then why do they need an expert? So I don't think it's necessary.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kratz, getting to you, uh, with respect to Dr. Armentrout, Counsel was asking for a copy of his CV and, as well, any sort of summary that you might be able to supply, even if it's at the 11th hour? Are you able to accommodate him on both those counts?

MR. KRATZ: Well, Judge, there is no written report. There is no summary. Uh, Dr. Armentrout's, uh, opinions will be based, uh, solely and entirely upon what's been provided, uh, by Dr. Gordon. So, the -- the -- the materials that, uh, uh, Dr. Armentrout will be drawing from, they already have.

The CV, uh, is something that I will ask to be faxed, and we'll try to get that, uh -- we'll try to get that, uh, here, Judge, and -- and, uh, accommodate, out of courtesy, uh, uh, the defense.

Um, did you ask me something else? I've --

MR. KRATZ: -- forgotten. Then I'll be quiet.

THE COURT: No. We'll -- we'll get to the -- the issue of what, if anything, Mr. Buckley can testify to based, uh -- based on, in part, what we hear tomorrow, and, in part, uh -- I want to review the -- the -- the report, uh, again. Report was handed -- I believe I got it on Friday from -- from the State.

MR. KRATZ: Might I suggest, Judge, that on Wednesday we might convene in court, perhaps, at, uh, 8:00 a.m. and, uh, get some direction. We expect Mr. Buckley to testify in the morning, and I think that is probably appropriate that everybody, not just the State, but that the defense, has fair notice about the, uh, scope of what he'll be allowed to testify about.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. FREMGEN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Any other matters today, gentlemen?

MR. KRATZ: Nothing for today. Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: All right? I'll see you tomorrow at 8:30.

(Court stands adjourned at 2:42 p.m.)

Continue to Day 81.Robert H. Gordon — Direct (Part 1)