4.Court's Substantive Jury Instructions
1 linesTHE COURT: Be seated. Morning, ladies and gentlemen. In a moment, I'm going to be reading you the instructions. The jury instructions. As you can see, excuse me, um, the clerk is handing copies of those instructions out. You can see how well I read, I suppose, by trying to follow along with me.
Uh, you certainly can and are urged to follow along. However, once closing argument has begun by counsel, I ask that you put those down and pay attention to, uh -- to what the lawyers have to say in the closing argument.
Uh, additionally, just -- just so you know, at the -- at the end of closing argument, before you retire for deliberation, we will -- the clerk will have a little drum up here and we're going to draw three names, the names of three jurors out of that drum. The first two will be discharged as jurors, and the third will be sequestered for the remaining, uh, part of the -- the deliberations. All right?
With that said, Members of the Jury, the Court will now instruct you upon the principles of law which you are to follow in considering the evidence and in reaching your verdict.
It is your duty to follow all of these instructions. Regardless of any opinion you may have about what the law is or ought to be, you must base your verdict on the law I give you in these instructions. Apply that law to the facts in the case which have been properly proven by the evidence. Consider only the evidence received during the trial and the law as given to you by the instructions, and from these alone, guided by your soundest reason and best judgment, reach your verdict.
If any member of the jury has any impression of my opinion as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, disregard that impression entirely and. decide the issues of fact solely as you view the evidence. You, the jury, are the sole judges of the facts, and the Court is the judge of the law only.
One defendant, three counts.
The first count of the Amended Information in this case charges Brendan Dassey, on October 31, 2005, as a party to a crime, did cause the death of Teresa M. Halbach, with the intent to kill that person, contrary to Sections 940.01(1) (a), 939.50(3) (a), and 939.05 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
To this charge, the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty, which means the State must prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
The second count of the Amended Information charges that Brendan Dassey, on October 31, 2005, as a party to the crime, did mutilate, disfigure, or dismember a corpse with the intent to conceal a crime, contrary to Sections 940.11(1), 939.50(3)(f), and 939.05 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
To this charge, the defendant has also entered a plea of not guilty, which means the State must prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
The third count of the Amended Information charges that Brendan Dassey, on October 31, 2005, as a party to a crime, by threat or use of force or violence, did have sexual intercourse with Teresa Halbach, without the consent of that person, contrary to Sections 940.225(2) (a), 939.50(3) (c), and 939.05 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
To this charge, the defendant has also entered a plea of not guilty, which means the State must prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
First degree intentional homicide. First degree reckless homicide. Party to a crime, aiding and abetting. Defendant either directly committed or intentionally aided the crime charged.
Section 939.05 of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin provides that whoever's concerned in the commission of a crime is a party to that crime and may be convicted of that crime although the person did not directly commit it.
The State contends that the defendant was concerned in the commission of the crime of first degree intentional homicide by either directly committing it or by intentionally aiding and abetting the person who directly committed it. If a person intentionally aids and abets the commission of a crime, then that person is guilty of the crime as well as the person who directly committed it.
A person who intention -- a person intentionally aids and abets the commission of a crime when, acting with knowledge or belief that another person is committing or intends to commit a crime, he either knowingly assists the person who commits the crime or is ready and willing to assist, and the person who commits the crime knows of the willingness to assist. To intentionally aid and abet first degree intentional homicide, the defendant must know that another person is committing or intends to commit the crime of first degree intentional homicide and have the purpose to assist the commission of that crime.
Before you may find the defendant guilty, the State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant directly committed the crime of first degree intentional homicide or intentionally aided and abetted the commission of that crime.
All 12 jurors do not have to agree whether the defendant directly committed the crime or aided and abetted the commission of the crime. However, each juror must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was concerned in the commission of the crime in one of these ways.
The defendant in this case is charged with first degree intentional homicide, and if -- you must first consider whether the defendant is guilty of that offense. If you are not satisfied that the defendant is guilty of first degree intentional homicide, you must consider whether or not the defendant is guilty of first degree reckless homicide, which is a less serious degree of criminal homicide.
The crimes referred to as first degree intentional and first degree reckless homicide are different types of homicide. Homicide is the taking of the life of another human being. The degree of homicide defined by the law depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
Both intentional and reckless homicide require that the defendant caused the death of the victim. First degree intentional homicide requires the State to prove that the defendant acted with the intent to kill. First degree reckless homicide requires that the defendant acted recklessly, under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life. It is for you to consider of what type of homicide the defendant is guilty, if guilty at all, according to the instructions which define the two offenses.
The statutory definition of first degree intentional homicide.
First degree intentional homicide as defined in 940.01 of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, is committed by one who causes the death of another human being with the intent to kill that person or another.
Before you may find the defendant guilty of first degree intentional homicide, the State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the following two elements were present:
Number one, the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, caused the death of Teresa Halbach.
"Cause" means that the defendant's act, or that the act of a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, was a substantial factor in producing the death.
Number two, the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, acted with the intent to kill Teresa Halbach.
"Intent to kill" means that the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, had the mental purpose to take the life of another human being or was aware that his conduct was practically certain to cause the death of another human being.
While the law requires that the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, acted with intent to kill, it does not require that the intent existed for any particular length of time before the act is committed. The act need not be brooded over, considered, or reflected upon for a week, a day, an hour, or even for a minute. There need not be any appreciable time between the formation of the intent and the act. The intent to kill may be formed at any time before the act, including the instant before the act, and must continue to exist at the time of the act.
You cannot look into a person's mind to find intent. Intent to kill must be found, if found at all, from the defendant's acts, words, and statements, if any, or those of a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, and from all the facts and circumstances in this case bearing upon intent. Intent should not be confused with motive. While proof of intent is necessary to a conviction, proof of motive is not. "Motive" refers to a person's reasons for doing something. While motive may be shown as a circumstance to aid in establishing the guilt of a defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, the State is not required to prove motive on the part of the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as party to the crime, in order to convict. Evidence of motive does not, by itself, establish guilt. You should give it the weight you believe it deserves under all the circumstances.
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of Teresa Halbach, with the intent to kill, or are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the commission of the offense, you should find the defendant guilty of first degree intentional homicide.
If you are not so satisfied, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree intentional homicide, and you should consider whether the defendant is guilty of first degree reckless homicide in violation of 940.02(1) of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, which is a lesser included offense of first degree intentional homicide.
You should make every reasonable effort to agree unanimously on the charge of first degree intentional homicide before considering the offense of first degree reckless homicide. However, if, after full and complete consideration of the evidence, you conclude that further deliberation would not result in unanimous agreement on the charge of first degree intentional homicide, you should consider whether the defendant is guilty of first degree reckless homicide.
First degree reckless homicide, as defined in 940.02(1) of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, is committed by one who recklessly causes the death of another human being under. circumstances that show utter disregard for human life.
Before you may find the defendant guilty of first degree reckless homicide, the State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the following three elements were present:
Number one, the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the, uh -- the crime, caused the death of Teresa Halbach.
"Cause" means that the defendant's act, or the act of a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, was a substantial factor in producing the death.
Number two, the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, caused the death by crimlin -- criminally reckless conduct.
"Criminally reckless conduct" means the conduct created a risk of death or great bodily harm to another person, and the risk of death or great bodily harm was unreasonable and substantial, and the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, was aware that his conduct created the unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm.
Number three, the circumstances of the defendant's conduct, or the conduct of a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, showed utter disregard for human life.
In determining whether the conduct showed utter disregard for human life, you should consider all the factors relating to the conduct. These include the following:
What the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, was doing.
Why the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, was engaged in that conduct.
How dangerous the conduct was.
How obvious the danger was.
And whether the conduct showed any regard for life.
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of Teresa Halbach by criminally reckless conduct, and that the circumstances of the conduct showed utter disregard for human life, or are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the commission of the offense, you should find the defendant guilty of first degree reckless homicide.
If you are not so satisfied, you must find the defendant not guilty.
You are not, in any event, to find the defendant guilty of more than one homicide offense.
Mutilating a corpse. Party to a crime. Aiding and abetting. The defendant either directly committed or intentionally aided the crime charged. Section 939.05 of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, provides that whoever is concerned with the commission of a crime is a party to that crime and may be convicted of that crime although the person did not directly commit it.
The State contends that the defendant was concerned in the commission of the crime of mutilating a corpse by either directly committing it or by intentionally aiding and abetting the person who directly committed it. If a person intentionally aids and abets the commission of a crime, then that person is guilty of the crime as well as the person who directly committed it.
Person intentionally aids and abets the commission of a crime when, acting with knowledge or belief that another person is committing or intends to commit a crime, he knowingly either assists the person who commits the crime, or is ready and willing to assist, and the person who commits the crime knows of the willingness to assist.
To intentionally aid and abet mutilating a corpse, the defendant must know that another person is committing or intends to commit the crime of mutilating a corpse and have the purpose to assist the commission of that crime.
Before you may find the defendant guilty, the State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant directly committed the crime of mutilating a corpse or intentionally aided and abetted the commission of that crime.
All 12 jurors do not have to agree whether the defendant directly committed the crime or aided and abetted the commission of the crime. However, each juror must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was concerned in the commission of the crime in one of those ways.
Section 940.11(1) of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, is violated by one who mutilates, disfigures, or dismembers a corpse with intention -- intent to conceal a crime or avoid apprehension, prosecution or conviction for a crime.
Before you may find the defendant guilty of this offense, the State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the following two elements were present:
Number one, the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, mutilated, disfigured or dismembered a corpse. "Corpse" means the dead body of a human being.
Number two, the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, mutilated, disfigured or dismembered a corpse with the intent to conceal a crime. This requires that the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, acted with the purpose to conceal a crime.
You cannot look into a person's mind to find out intent. Intent must be found, if found at all, from the defendant's acts, words, and statements, if any, or those of a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, and from all the facts and circumstances in this case bearing upon intent.
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that both elements of this offense have been proved, or are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant -- defendant intentionally aided and abetted in the commission of the offense, you should find the defendant guilty.
If you are not so satisfied, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Second degree sexual assault. Party to a crime. Aiding and abetting. The defendant either charged -- uh, either directly committed or intentionally aided the crime charged.
Section 939.05 of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, provides that whoever is concerned in the commission of a crime, is a party to that crime and may be convicted of that crime although the person did not directly commit it.
The State contends that the defendant was concerned in the commission of the crime of second degree sexual assault by either directly committing it or by intentionally aiding and abetting the person who directly committed it. If a person intentionally aids and abets the commission of a crime, then that person is guilty of the crime as well as the person who directly committed it.
A person intentionally aids and abets the commission of a crime when, acting with knowledge or belief that another person is committing or intends to commit a crime, he knowingly either assists the person who commits the crime, or is ready and willing to assist, and the person who commits the crime knows of the willingness to assist. To intentionally aid and abet second degree sexual assault, the defendant must know that another person is committing or intends to commit the crime of second degree sexual assault and have the purpose to assist the commission of that crime.
Before you may find the defendant guilty, the State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant directly committed the crime of second degree sexual assault or intentionally aided and abetted the commission of that crime.
All 12 jurors do not have to agree whether the defendant directly committed the crime or aided and abetted the commission of the crime. However, each juror must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was concerned in the commission of the crime in one of those ways.
Second degree sexual assault. Sexual intercourse without consent by use of threat or violence.
Second degree sexual assault, as defined in Section 940.225(2) (a) of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, is committed by one who has sexual intercourse with another person without consent and by use or threat of force or violence.
Before you may find that the defendant is guilty of this offense, the State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the following three elements were present:
Number one, the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, had sexual intercourse with Teresa Halbach.
Number two, Teresa Halbach did not consent to the sexual intercourse.
Number three, the defendant, or a person with whom he was acting as a party to the crime, had sexual intercourse with Teresa Halbach by use of threat -- by use or threat of force or violence.
The use or threat of force or violence may occur before or as part of the sexual intercourse.
"Sexual intercourse" means any intrusion, however slight, by any part of a person's body or of any object, into the genital or anal opening of another. Emission of semen is not required.
"Did not consent" means that Teresa Halbach did not freely agree to have sexual intercourse with the defendant. In deciding whether Teresa Halbach did not consent, you should consider what Teresa Halbach said and did, along with all the other facts and circumstances. This element does not require that Teresa Halbach offered physical resistance.
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had sexual intercourse with Teresa Halbach without consent and by use or threat of force or violence, or are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the commission of the offense, you should find the defendant guilty of second degree sexual assault.
If you are not so satisfied, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Burden of proof and presumption of innocence.
In reaching your verdict, examine the evidence with care and caution. Act with judgment, reason, and prudence.
Defendants are not required to prove their innocence. The law presumes every person charged with the commission of an offense to be innocent. This presumption requires a finding of not guilty unless, in your deliberations, you find it is overcome by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
The burden of establishing every fact necessary to constitute guilt is upon the State. Before you can return a verdict of guilty, the evidence must satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
If you can reconcile the evidence upon any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence, you should do so and return a verdict of not guilty.
The term "reasonable doubt" means any doubt based upon reason and common sense. It is a doubt for which a reason can be given arising from a fair and rational consideration of the evidence or lack of evidence. It means such a doubt as -- as would cause a person of ordinary prudence to pause or hesitate when called upon to act in the most important affairs of life.
A reasonable doubt is not a doubt which is based upon mere guesswork or speculation. A doubt which arises merely from sympathy or from fear to return a verdict of guilt is not a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is not a doubt such as may be used to escape the responsibility of a decision.
While it is your duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt, you are not to search for doubt. You are to search for the truth. Information not evidence. An Information is nothing more than a written formal accusation against a defendant charging the com -- uh, commission of one or more criminal acts. You are not to consider it as evidence against the defendant in any way. It does not raise any inference of guilt.
Evidence defined.
Evidence is, first, the sworn testimony of witnesses, both on direct and cross-examination, regardless of who called the witness.
Second, the exhibits the Court has received, whether or not an exhibit goes to the jury room.
Third, any facts to which the lawyers have agreed or stipulated or which the Court is directed -- or which the Court has directed you to find.
Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence. You are to decide the case solely on the evidence offered and received at trial.
The district attorney and the attorney for the defendant have stipulated or agreed as follows:
Steven Schmitz is a citizen living in New Holstein, Wisconsin, a community located 30 miles west of Manitowoc, Wisconsin.
JoEllen Zipperer is a citizen living in rural Manitowoc County, Wisconsin.
That if called to testify, Steven Schmitz would testify that on October 31, 2005, Teresa Halbach came to the Schmitz property to take a photo of a vehicle for Auto Trader Magazine. Schmitz would indicate that Halbach was at his residence at approximately 1:30 p.m., was there for approximately ten minutes, was wearing a white shirt, wait -- waist-length jacket, and blue jeans. Schmitz would state that before leaving, Halbach provided Schmitz with the latest Auto Trader Magazine and a bill of sale, left his property, and drove away in her SUV.
Number three, that if called to testify, JoEllen Zipperer would testify that on October 31,. 2005, Teresa Halbach came to the Zipperer property to take a photo of a vehicle for Auto. Trader Magazine. Zipperer would indicate that Halbach was at her residence between approximately 2:00 to 2:30 p.m., was at there -- was there for approximately ten minutes, was wearing a white top, waist-length jacket, and blue jeans. 4Zipperer would state that before leaving, Halbach provided her with the latest Auto Trader Magazine and a bill of sale, left her property, and drove away in her SUV. Zipperer would finally state that the Avery Salvage Yard is no more than a ten-minute drive from her residence in Manitowoc County.
On October 31, 2005, Bobby Dassey was the son of Barb Janda and brother of the defendant, Brendan Dassey. Bobby Dassey lived in the same residence with Barb Janda and Brendan Dassey at the time.
That if called to testify, Bobby Dassey would state that between 2:30 and 2:45 p.m. on October 31, 2005, he was inside the Janda/Dassey residence, where he observed a blue, slash, green Toyota Rav 4 stop outside the residence, in close proximity to a maroon van that his mother, Barb Janda, had for sale.
Bobby Dassey would state that he observed a young woman, that he later came to identify as Tressa Halbach, exit her. vehicle, take some photos of the maroon van and walk toward the trailer of Steven Avery.
Bobby Dassey would further state that after taking a shower, he left the residence at approximately 3:00 p.m. to go deer hunting, at which time he still observed the Rav 4 parked outside his residence, but that Teresa Halbach was not observed.
Bobby Dassey would state that he returned to the residence at approximately 5:00 p.m. and no longer observed the Rav 4.
On October 31, 2005, Scott Tadych was the boyfriend of Barba Janda, knew the defendant, Brendan Dassey, Steven Avery, and other family members living at the Avery Salvage Yard.
That if called to testify, Scott Tadych would state that between 7:30 and 7:45 p.m. on October 31, 2005, he was at the Janda, slash, Dassey property, where he dropped off Barb Janda.
Tadych would state that he observed a large fire in the burn area behind the detached garage of Steven Avery.
Tadych would further indicate that at the time, he observed Brendan Dassey and Seven Avery standing next to the fire.
Number eight, Dr. Jeffrey Jentzen is the Chief Medical Examiner for Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, and is a Board Certified Forensic Pathologist. Dr. Jentzen agreed to be a medical consultant in this case and offered expert testimony as to the manner and cause of death of Teresa Halbach. That if called to testify, Dr. Jentzen would state that after consultation with Forensic Anthropologist, Dr. Leslie Eisenberg, he reviewed reports, photographs, x-rays, bone fragments, and other materials surrounding the Teresa Halbach death investigation.
Dr. Jentzen would testify that, in his expert opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the manner of death of Teresa Halbach was homicide, and the cause of death was gunshot wounds to the head.
On October 31, 2005, Angela Schuster was the manager for Auto Trader Magazine, with headquarters in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. On the same date, Dawn Pliszka, performed duties as receptionist for Auto Trader.
That if called to testify, Angela Schuster would testify that Teresa Halbach was hired as a photographer for Auto Trader in October, 2004, and continued in that employment through October 31, 2005. Schuster -- Schuster would further state that Teresa Halbach had performed photo shoots at the Avery salvage business on five occasions pri -- prior to October 31 in 2005; including, June 20, August 22, August 29, September 19, and October 10.
That if called to testify, Dawn Pliszka would testify that on October 31, 2005, she received a phone call from Steven Avery at approximately 8:12 a.m., at which time Avery requested that, quote, the same girl that had been out here before, end quote, come to his property to take photos of a van he had for sale. Pliszka would further state that Avery made the appointment under the name, quote, B. Janda, end quote, and that Pliszka left a voice mail for Teresa Halbach at 9:46 a.m., asking if she could make the appointment.
Number 13, that if called to testify, Dawn Pliszka would further testify that at 2:27 p.m., she did speak with Teresa Halbach on Teresa's cell phone, at which time Ms. Halbach indicated that she was, quote, on her way, end quote, to the Avery property from her previous appointment.
You will consider that testimony in the same manner as if it had been given under oath here in court.
Circumstantial evidence. It is not necessary that every fact be proved directly by a witness or an exhibit. A fact may be proved indirectly by circumstantial evidence. "Circumstantial evidence" is evidence from which a jury may logically find other facts according to common knowledge and experience.
Circumstantial evidence is not necessarily better or worse than direct evidence. Either type of evidence can prove a fact. Whether evidence is direct or circumstantial, it must satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense before you may find the defendant guilty.
Confessions. Admissions. The State has introduced evidence of statements which it claims were made by the defendant, is for you to determine how much weight, if any, to give to each statement. In evaluating each statement, you must determine three things:
Whether the statement was actually made by the defendant. Only -- only so much of a statement as was actually made by a person may be considered as evidence.
Whether the statement was accurately restated here at trial.
Whether the statement, or any part of it, ought to be believed.
You should consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of each statement, along with all the other evidence, in determining how much weight, if any, the statement deserves.
Jurors knowledge. In weighing the evidence, you may take into account matters of your common knowledge and your observations and experience in the affairs of life.
Remarks of counsel. Remarks of the attorneys are not evidence. If the remarks suggest certain facts not in evidence, disregard the suggestion.
Closing arguments of counsel. Consider, carefully, the closing arguments of the attorneys, but their arguments and conclusions and opinions are not evidence. Draw your own conclusions from the evidence and decide upon your verdict according to the evidence under the instructions given to you by the Court.
Exhibits. An exhibit becomes evidence only when received by the Court. An exhibit marked for identification and not received is not evidence. An exhibited -- an exhibit received is evidence, whether or not it goes to the jury room.
Objections of counsel. Evidence received over objections. Attorneys for each side have the right and the duty to object to what they consider are improper questions asked of witnesses and to the admission of other evidence which they believe is not properly admissible. You should not draw any conclusions from the fact an objection was made.
By allowing testimony or other evidence to be received over the objection of counsel, the Court is not indicating any opinion about the evidence. You, jurors, are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.
Improper questions. Disregard, entirely, any question that the Court did not allow to be answered. Do not guess at what the witness' answer might have been. If the evidence, it -- itself, suggested that certain information may be true, ignore the suggestion and do not consider it as evidence.
Stricken testimony. During the trial, the Court has ordered certain testimony to be stricken. Disregard all stricken testimony.
Weight of evidence. The weight of evidence does not depend on the number of witnesses on each side. You may find that the testimony of one witness is entitled to greater evidence than that of another witness or even of several other witnesses.
Expert opinion testimony. Ordinarily, a witness may testify only about facts. However, a witness with expertise in a particular field may give an opinion in that field. You should consider the qualifications and credibility of the expert, the facts upon which the opinion is based, and the reasons given for the opinion.
Opinion evidence was received to help you reach a conclusion. However, you are not bound by any expert's opinion.
In resolving conflicts in expert testimony, weigh the different expert opinions against each other. Also consider the qualifications and credibility of the experts and the facts supporting their opinions.
Credibility of witnesses. It is the duty of the jury to scrutinize and to weigh the testimony of witnesses and to determine the effect of the evidence as a whole. You are the sole judges of the credibility. That is, the believability of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.
In determining the credibility of each witness and the weight you give to the testimony of each witness, consider these factors:
Whether the witness has an interest or lack of interest in the result of this trial.
The witness' conduct, appearance, and demeanor on the witness stand.
The clearness or lack of clearness of the witness' recollections.
The opportunity the witness had for observing and for knowing the matters the witness testified about.
The reasonableness of the witness' testimony.
The apparent intelligence of the witness.
Bias or prejudice, if any has been shown.
Possible motives for falsifying testimony.
And all other facts and circumstances during the trial which tend either to support or to discredit the testimony.
Then give to the testimony of each witness the weight you believe it should receive.
The defendant has testified in this case, and you should not discredit the testimony just because the defendant is charged with a crime. Use the same factors to determine the credibility and the weight of the defendant's testimony that you use to evaluate the testimony of any other witness.
There is no magic way for you to evaluate the testimony. Instead, you should use your common sense and experience. In everyday life, you determine for yourselves the reliability of things people say to you. You should do the same here.
Ladies and gentlemen, at this time that concludes the instructions I'm going to give. Later on, I will give a few more. Now is the time for closing argument. Counsel?