5.Renewed Motion to Dismiss Remaining Counts Denied
8 linesMR. STRANG: The defense moves now, at the close of all evidence, for a judgment dismissing, with prejudice, the remaining three counts of the second Amended Information. I ask the Court, without further argument, to consider all of the evidence now received and to conclude that, even in the light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable inferences in the State's favor, the evidence is insufficient, as to each one of the three counts, to justify a reasonable jury concluding that the State has proven all essential elements as to each of those counts.
And I acknowledge, again, that as to one of the counts, Count 3, the felon in possession of a firearm count, we did stipulate to one element, so as to that element, the status as a convicted felon on the relevant date, there the evidence is sufficient because stipulated. But as to the other charges and their essential elements, I ask for judgment of dismissal for want of sufficient evidence.
THE COURT: Anything from the State?
MR. KRATZ: Just that the actual legal standard the Court is supposed to apply at this stage, not in the light most favorable to the State, but could a reasonable juror find guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt. We do believe that that slightly higher standard has also been met regarding the three remaining counts. Would ask the Court, without further argument, deny that motion.
THE COURT: For many of the reasons which the Court gave this morning, the Court believes that it has already had adequate opportunity to address this motion and the Court is going to deny the motion to dismiss the remaining three counts against the defendant at this time. Anything else before we adjourn this afternoon?
MR. STRANG: Yes. Mr. Buting was concerned that I was unclear, and I often am, as to the felon in possession count. I meant to concede only that one of the essential elements of that count is established, not concede that any of the other essential elements of that count are established. And second --
THE COURT: That's how I understood your argument.
MR. STRANG: Well, then, the Court's become accustomed, perhaps, unfortunately, to my clumsy way of speaking. I also had, before this trial started, I think on February 2, suggested that a mistrial may be warranted, if, in fact, the State sought to proceed on the false imprisonment count and then fell short in its case-in-chief. That's what happened. I am not at the moment moving for a mistrial, because I want to think long and hard about whether necessity for that really is manifest. And there's nothing happening with the jury now so, sequentially, if I wish to make that argument, I know that I could do it tomorrow, out of the jury's presence. So I'm not making that motion now, but I want to alert the Court and counsel that the matter is fresh in my mind and under consideration.
THE COURT: Very well. If there's nothing further, we're adjourned for this afternoon.