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Steven AverytranscripttranscriptRequest for Curative Instruction on Fairgrieve Cross-Examination - Day 22 - Steven AveryThe court declined a curative instruction about a question concerning Dr. Fairgrieve’s lack of a written report, then addressed the verdict forms and jury instructions.
Thomas J. FallonDean A. StrangPatrick L. WillisMR. STRANGTHE COURTMR. FALLONprocedural
Steven Avery/Day 22/March 13, 2007
3 pages·0 witnesses·117 lines
The court resolved jury instruction requests, declined a separate instruction concerning Dr. Fairgrieve's written report, and again denied a request to remove a seated juror.
Request for Curative Instruction on Fairgrieve Cross-Examination
ProceduralProc.Request for Curative Instruction on Fairgrieve Cross-Examination

MR. STRANG: I have already addressed it and only one remains, which I did not submit in writing. It was an issue I raised briefly in chambers this morning, concerns the State's cross-examination of Dr. Fairgrieve. And the background is this, the State was pursuing what I thought was a perfectly appropriate line of cross-examination of Dr. Fairgrieve on the fact that he did not prepare a report.

In the main, Mr. Fallon's questions were unobjectionable and they were good cross-examination. One question, and it was the last question that he asked in this area, before moving on, but one of the questions, I thought, crossed the line. And I had the court reporter prepare just a very brief excerpt of that question and the answer only, which I will read. The question was:

Question: And that's so when the gentleman who happens to be on the other side of the prosecution by the Crown, so that they would have fair notice of exactly what opinions you were going to express so they would know what they were?

Answer: Yes.

I did not object at the time. I decided, at the time -- First of all, I was slow on the uptake. It seemed like it crossed a line to me. I wasn't as quick as I should have been in articulating, to myself, the reason that crossed the line. I did not object at the time.

Rather, at the next break, I raised the issue informally with Mr. Fallon. I think I probably even told him I was going to ask the court reporter to read back that testimony to me or prepare a short excerpt, because I could not remember exactly what Mr. Fallon had said, that had rubbed me wrong.

The court reporter did prepare the short excerpt I just read, a little later. I raised this informally in chambers, and I don't even remember when, but it was well after Dr. Fairgrieve was off the stand by that time. And the problem is, the suggestion that we did not give the State fair notice of Dr. Fairgrieve's opinion.

We did. We complied with Section 971.23 -- well, whatever the provision is that requires the defense to give notice of expert opinions. It's true that we didn't give a report, to the State, from Dr. Fairgrieve. But we're not required to do that under the discovery statute. That's one of two options.

We chose the second option, which was to provide a summary of it, his expert opinion and its basis. We also provided his curriculum vitae. The State objected to the adequacy of our notice. The Court directed us to provide some further, more specific notice of Dr. Fairgrieve's opinion. And we did that. Once we amended our notice of his opinion, there was no further complaint from the State. And I think our discovery obligation was met and, therefore, as a matter of law, there was fair notice of his opinion.

Now, again, the fact -- the mere fact that he didn't prepare a report is a fair subject for cross-examination. And the questions immediately preceding the question I quoted today, were unobjectionable, in my view. But I had no strategic reason for not objecting.

Indeed, I knew at the time it was a problem. If my -- if my manner of handling it was a waiver, then, it was a waiver without a reason, without a strategic choice, or a -- or a good -- a good reason on which I could defend my waiver. And the intention, as I told folks off the record, which doesn't count, I understand, was to seek a brief curative instruction, not make a terribly big deal out of it, but I thought it was worth a curative instruction. I still do.

At this point, I think the curative instruction should not refer to -- or need not refer to Dr. Fairgrieve, or even to the State. There's no need to scold at this point. A curative instruction could be that, you know, something to the effect that both parties provided adequate notice, as required by law, or fair notice as required by Wisconsin law, the opinions of their experts, wouldn't have to be anything fancier than that.

And I asked the Court to give, somewhere in the final instructions, a curative instruction along those lines. I also asked the Court forbid a State argument that it was not given fair notice of Dr. Fairgrieve's opinions. I think it was. I think we complied with the discovery statute in that respect.

THE COURT: Mr. Fallon.

MR. FALLON: Thank you. Much ado about little. As counsel acknowledges, the questioning and cross-examination was clearly appropriate, the point simply being that Dr. Fairgrieve, who at every point in the past in his career had issued a report, did you issue a report in this case. That's fair cross-examination, nothing to apologize for.

This -- Every now and again, as a prosecutor, we're entitled to throw a net or a lifeline to counsel. I don't see his need to fall on the sword here, or accept some kind of reprimand from who may review this case in the future. It's entirely unnecessary.

Again, the sole point is that he always writes a report, but he didn't write a report in this case, fair cross-examination.

The other way of looking at this -- because that's all that was intended by the question, by the way. Another way of looking at this is that, as counsel aptly noted, they have two ways of complying with the provisions. One, was to write a report, one is to give a summary. They chose a summary.

Don't beat yourself up now or second guess your selection, your choice, they chose a summary, not a report. Doesn't mean I can't ask the question, that you always wrote a report every other time in the past, but you didn't write one here.

So, again, he's saying a waiver without knowledge, a waiver without strategic reason; that's not true. It had already occurred. It occurred back in January when the original report was submitted. So for that context, the State does not intend to argue that we didn't have notice.

Although, I would note, inferentially, and I still do, that the amended disclosure contained an opinion which was different than the opinion rendered on the stand regarding the possibility of the burn barrel being the primary burn location. So, for what that's worth, they were different.

But the intent of the argument that the State will make is simply that he always writes a report and he didn't write a report this time. That's the point of the question. And they had the opportunity to choose, as I said, summary or report. They chose summary, but that's their right. So I don't think -- There's much ado about nothing.

MR. STRANG: Well, I do need to be heard in reply, because as I conceded, the general line of questioning, cross-examination, was appropriate. And if the questioning had stopped where Mr. Fallon says he meant to stop, or with the point he says he meant to make, it would have been appropriate. If this had stopped with, so you always write a report, this is the first time in your career you haven't written a report. Fine, unobjectionable.

This question went the next step. It went farther. It was, you know, by not writing a report, then, in essence, there is not fair notice of exactly what opinions you were going to express to the counsel for the other side, so that they would know what they were. And I won't reread this, I'm paraphrasing it, but I read verbatim, the final question. And that -- the implication that there was --

THE COURT: Read it verbatim again.

MR. STRANG: Sure.

Question: And here now I wish I had gotten the preceding question, but it was -- I think the preceding question probably was what Mr. Fallon said, which is, this is the first time you have not written a report, something like that.

So the question in issue begins:

Question: And that's so when the gentleman who happens to be on the other side of the prosecution by the Crown, so that they would have fair notice of exactly what opinions you were going to express so they would know what they were?

Answer: Yes.

I will give it to the Court. Now, did Mr. Fallon mean to do anything wrong? No, he was pursuing a fair line of questioning. He went one question too far in my view. It's a slip of the tongue. It happens in the heat of battle. Lord knows in cross-examination I have asked one question too many at various points. But this was objectionable and I missed it. I didn't make timely objection.

THE COURT: All right. Here's what I'm going to do. If -- As I understand it, Mr. Fallon, your point was not that you didn't get some discovery in this case that you were supposed to get, but rather that he always prepares a report in all his other cases, but he didn't in this one.

MR. FALLON: That was the intent and the focus of the question. And it wasn't until afterwards that I gave some thought about the fact that the amended disclosure held one opinion that was different. But like I said, you already ruled on that matter, so.

THE COURT: Let me ask this, do you intend to make reference in your closing to the fact that, not that you didn't get a report that you should have gotten, but to the fact that it's significant he did not prepare a report in this case.

Here's the -- I'm not precluding you from doing that. All I'm saying, let me get to the point. If you say something like that in your closing, you will have to add, and let the jury know, something to the effect, I'm not saying we didn't get a report that we should have gotten, but it's significant he didn't prepare a report. Do you understand?

MR. FALLON: Right. Maybe we're just coming at it from different angles. Our argument is not that we didn't have notice, the argument we want to make. The argument is, he didn't write a report.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm only saying that, if you choose to point that out to the jury --

MR. FALLON: We have an obligation, I see what you are saying.

THE COURT: And I think that addresses, Mr. Strang, your concern, because you have acknowledged that he was entitled to show the jury that the witness usually prepared a report but did not here.

THE COURT: As long as there's not an implication that somehow the State didn't get something to which it should have been entitled.

MR. STRANG: As long as there's no implication that the State did not get fair notice, which is what the question implied. And I would like that cured, and it can be cured in a general way.

THE COURT: I'm not -- I don't view it as a significant part of, you know, the many weeks and exhibits worth of evidence that came in in this trial. I don't think it warrants its own instruction, but I will caution the State that if it raises that issue in any fashion in closing, that -- that it reference the fact that the State is not claiming that it didn't get some notice it should have gotten. Before we leave jury instructions, I don't recall if I have asked the parties on the record if the verdict forms are acceptable.

MR. FALLON: They are to the State.

THE COURT: All right. I will make the -- the modifications in 300 and 180, that were placed on the record. Otherwise, I will leave the jury instructions as they were submitted to you today, with the exception of removing the red lining. Other than the defense requested instructions that the Court has already been denied, does that resolve the issue on instructions?

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